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with 1,350,000 inhabitants, but it has lost more people (1,394,000 men only). By decreased birth rate it has lost another 1,500,000 people. The material loss of its ten departments, which were among the richest, is computed to be 130 milliards. This amount, it is said, shall be repaid by Germany. The real expenses of war which it must bear alone amount to 200 milliards, which means from 10 to 12 milliards of annual interest. According to Charles Gide's computation, this means the fourth part of the income of every Frenchman. With all this heavy load, France must reckon with the danger that the conquered and maimed Germany is thinking of revenge and is going to start a new war at an opportune moment. This enforced preparedness is another immense load. Therefore every German must learn to understand why France exerts all her strength to hold Germany down, never to let it come up again; that, in order to save itself, it believes in the necessity of trying to destroy Germany.

In order to lighten its own load, to obtain reparation of inflicted damages, France ought to help Germany in its economic restoration. But France must be afraid to help its own assassin to become strong, since the economic restoration of Germany would also strengthen its military power, as long as the German people remain true to its old military traditions. And this old militaristic Germany will live, will be restored and kept alive by France, as long as the latter, for fear of a revengeful Germany, intends to find its protection in militarism. If anything proves the folly of world anarchy, it is the phenomenon that every action which might help to make life easier, might lead to salvation, at the same time engenders death-bringing results, that every attempt at salvation simultaneously becomes an attempt at suicide.

There is only one way out of this dilemma: France and Germany must make peace—real peace. In it Germany must assume the honest obligation to help to restore France economically, and France must assume the obligation of a gradual and systematic reduction of the life-restricting and degrading conditions of the Versailles Treaty. By doing this, France would help to restore Germany economically, but thereby the German democracy would be given that strength which will enable it to conquer alone its militarists and nationalists. France would do away with the danger threatening from German militarism. Germany alone can save France, and France alone can save Germany. The sensible people in both countries must get together to find this way out and to bring about a peace congress of the representatives of France and Germany. It need not be a peace of love and endearments, but a treaty in which both nations, soberly and without passion, merely moved by self-love, safeguard their common conditions of life. But it must not be a peace directed against another country. That would not help any. This peace treaty, securing the life and the restoration of both nations, would form the presupposition of the League of Nations becoming a fact. This would give to it a great historical importance. Humanity would breathe more easily. The German-French antagonism has pulled it into war; its rational settlement only would bring real peace. There is no other way.

LETTERS FROM THE KAISER TO THE CZAR *

By BARON S. A. KORFF, LL. D.

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THE PUBLISHING OF THE KAISER'S LETTERS to the Czar must be looked at as a great event for the historians of that epoch. There is no doubt that these letters will always occupy an important place in modern European history. They are most interesting as one of the many weighty sources of our possible knowledge of the psychology of the rulers of Germany and Russia; though certainly, taken by themselves, they are insufficient, as they give only one side of the picture; the answers of the Czar are still hidden in the depth of the Berlin State Archives. Unfortunately, one cannot hope for a speedy release of those Russian answers, as they will hardly tend to magnify the Kaiser's former glory.

The historical meaning of the Kaiser's letters can be viewed from three points of view: First, as depicting the Kaiser's rôle and policy, explaining at least some phases of Germany's position during his reign; secondly, as giving a most vivid picture of his personality, which as yet has not found a satisfying description; and, thirdly, as an influence on modern events. Their publication has called forth already a voluminous exchange of views, especially from Germany.

At the time Levine's volume was published, the main trend of the Kaiser's efforts in St. Petersburg was well known, because his telegraphic correspondence concerning the proposed treaty with Russia and France had been published by Mr. Herman Bernstein. The articles, entitled "The Willy-Nicky Correspondence during the years 1904-1907," gave us the gist of the matter, though certainly far less vividly and strongly than the full text of Wilhelm's letters.

In a long introductory chapter, Mr. Levine gives a detailed explanation of the way the Kaiser's letters were found and copied by him in Russia and how their first appearance in the press was met in Germany and England. Wilhelm's letters cover the period of practically the whole of the Czar's reign, viz., November, 1894, to March, 1914, their correspondence having stopped only very shortly before the World War. They are all written in English and couched in most friendly language, ending invariably with kind messages of love and greeting to the Czarina and signed "most affectionate" or "devoted cousin and friend, Willy." They were usually dispatched by special messengers of the Kaiser's or the Czar's personal suite.

Germany's Pre-war Policy

The most important historical meaning of this correspondence of the two deposed monarchs lies certainly in the light it throws on the pre-war general policy of Germany, and hence on the developments of these last decades in eastern Europe. The chief fact is the great change of policy that was caused by William turning his back on England, with whom he was on very friendly

* Copied and published by Isaac Don Levine (New York, Fred. A. Stokes Co., 1920).

terms at the beginning of his reign, and his turning to Russia as a counter-move. The explanation the Kaiser gives himself of this, as well as of his newly developed hatred of England, is the policy of his uncle Bertie; and no impartial observer can help feeling that there was some justification in such a point of view. King Edward VII did all he could to harm Germany. His plan of encirclement, his visit to Reval in 1908, his unending intrigues with Russia, France, Italy, etc., as well as his home armaments, could not but arouse Germany's suspicions; and it is a very poor excuse to say that this was done only in self-defense; the aggressive element in Edward's policy was much too evident, even to the uninitiated. Edward only too often acted independently of his ministers and sometimes behind their backs and probably without even their knowledge. He was a past master of personal talks.

Now, it was Bismarck's old, well-established policy, his firmest conviction and probably cleverest theory, that Germany always ought to maintain the closest friendship relations with Russia and the Czars, at all costs. The chief objects of this policy were two: as safe insurance against France or any attempt on the part of the latter to prepare a "revanche"; and, secondly, a best way to protect the institutions of autocracy of Germany as well as Russia. Only by keeping in close friendly touch with Russia, accordingly, could Germany feel safe on her western frontier and maintain her inner autocratic rule of an irresponsible Kaiser. Modern developments have sufficiently proved how right Bismarck was, from his point of view, no matter how undemocratic and reactionary such a policy might be deemed. The two autocracies were doomed to stand and fall together, and good relations with Russia did mean for Germany peace in the west.

At the time William came to the throne he violently reversed this policy of Bismarck. He hated and feared the old man, who was too strong and independent for him. This partially explains his immoderate desire to turn upside down all Bismarck's achievements. On the other hand, William was brought up by his mother to like and revere England and the English people, which accounts for his early friendship with that country, a friendship which lasted for several years.

Then came the change, caused by three main factors: 1st, the astonishing growth of German expansion in every domain and respect, which turned the heads of her rulers, made them conceited and overbearing to the possible limit, and finally led to their own downfall; 2d, the above-mentioned personal policy of King Edward, which was irritating and provoking Berlin; and, 3d, the change that came in the Russian policy in the gradual strengthening of her bonds with France, which necessarily broke Bismarck's traditions.

Hatred of England

Analyzing the historical events of this period, one must constantly keep in mind that Germany's policy was the personal policy of the Kaiser; that he alone directed it with all his personal impetuosity and passion. Thus, one of the most remarkable and historically probably the most important trait characterizing this correspondence of William is his evident and overwhelming hatred of England. The force of this factor cannot be

denied. Its evidence bursts on us at nearly every page of these letters, growing constantly stronger as time went on. It was caused certainly not only by the incidents of the international situation, but also by the inner development of Germany. William hated parliamentary institutions, and the English parliamentary rule rightly seemed to him the greatest danger to his beloved autocracy.

His letters prove clearly how his dread of and hatred of England gradually grew in strength, how this led to his planning a German-Russian-French alliance, as a necessary counter-move, and how the European situation worried him day and night. They do not prove, however, as the German historians try to state (for instance, Professor Goetz), that peace was the Kaiser's final and main object. The chief indictment against the Kaiser, that he willed the war, still remains unassailable and undeniable. Peace was necessary to him only as long as Germany, in his opinion, was not yet ready for war; and when the moment came, when he thought himself sufficiently strong and prepared, he was ready to fight and discard all his peace ambitions. The idea of the necessity and usefulness of a "preventive war," with all its immoral and treacherous consequences, was much too deeply rooted in the psychology of the German ruling class, Wilhelm included.

Studying the correspondence of the Kaiser, we find many interesting details of the international events of this epoch; no historian of these times will be able to avoid investigating these letters. One of the most interesting events was certainly his attempt to cajole Nicholas into an anti-English alliance. As is known since the publication of the Willy-Nicky correspondence, in a way he succeeded. The Czar did give him his signature at Björkö, and Witte's efforts could not destroy this later in Berlin. This is the explanation of Wilhelm's famous speech from the palace balcony the day of the declaration of war with Russia; he was waving a sheet of paper (the treaty with the Czar) and shouting, "*Er hat mir belogen, er hat mich betrogen*" (He, the Czar, lied to me and deceived me), alluding to this treaty. At the time, the treaty not being known to the outside world, these words remained for a long while an unexplainable mystery. This incident is also very characteristic of the analysis of the Kaiser's personality.

The Kaiser's Character

The Kaiser's letters are most interesting and enlightening to any one who would like to study his impetuous and unbalanced character. It is not surprising that he stigmatized their publication as a "dirty violation of propriety." He must have realized very well what a vivid picture his correspondence with the Czar gave the world at large; how they divulged some of his most secret political moves or ambitions; how they bared his violent passions and his overwhelming conceit. The educated and enlightened Germans well realize at present what harm was done to their people by such an uncontrollable and irresponsible ruler. Hardly can one find better proof of the dangers of autocracy. Maximilian Harden, the well-known German writer, branded the Kaiser only too well. The less passionate Hans Dehlbrück concurred, using more scientific arguments (see the *Preuss. Zahrbücher*). The letters condemn Wil-

helm absolutely as a ruler and reveal in a glaring light all his governmental theories and ideals, his hopes and aspirations. He was the all-mighty Lord, chosen and blessed of God, the super-man of Nietzsche, the great ruler of the greatest people on earth. And yet we also see how limited his intellectual and political horizons were; how little he realized the modern trend of social development, and how very superficial (to say the least!) his achievements were—art, literature, and scientific knowledge included. In ordinary life he probably would have been a very secondary dilettante or amateur artist and scientist. The German governing system, his servile entourage, and the overbearing Prussian ruling class lifted him up to undeserved heights, to a position of which he was not in the least worthy.

Among the many traits of William's character, some seem very repulsive. Perhaps the worst one, pointed out long ago by the English press, was his singular moral obtuseness. The Jesuitic principle, that the end justifies the means, was constantly supreme, and all that seemed good and useful for himself was deemed best for others. This does not in any way contradict his possible love of Germany and of "his" people. William was patriotic, in his way, and he no doubt strove vigorously to establish the future happiness of the German people.

Another trait of the Kaiser's character, most unsympathetic, was his hypocrisy. Ever so many letters of William breathe that unwholesome spirit of falsity. His personal opinion of the Czar must have been all the time a very low one, and yet he constantly caters hypocritically to the Czar's pride and conceit. He flatters him, praises him, cajoles him, having invariably a personal motive or purpose in mind. Not a single letter gives us a proof of real personal friendship. What the Kaiser wanted was invariably and exclusively either Russia's help and military assistance or the strengthening of the institutions of autocracy, mainly of his own power, "by the grace of God." No matter what we think of William's other characteristics, hypocrisy and falsity will always remain his predominating traits.

What of the Future

Further, we come to the third element, suggested by the analysis of the Kaiser's correspondence, namely, the possible lessons for future generations, and especially for the Germans. From this point of view the Kaiser's letters are very instructive indeed.

As was to be expected, the Germans have reacted in two different ways on the publication of this correspondence: One group of writers, among whom Professor Goetz is the most prominent, has tried to analyze the correspondence from the point of view of international politics only; the other one, with Harden and Dehlbrück at their head, have gone deeper into the matter, and have studied as well the relations of the Kaiser, the government, and the German people at large.

The first-mentioned group avoids all personal attacks. They only point out the dangers and consequences of a wavering, unsteady, haphazard international policy of Germany during the reign of Wilhelm. They are mostly monarchists and do not want to undermine their main and beloved principle. They simply outline, according to their ideals, the necessary international policy of Germany. In most cases it amounts simply to the

further development of Bismarck's policy, as mentioned above, the foundation of which was always to be the friendship and good understanding with Russia. There is no doubt whatever, in our mind, that in the future this will certainly be the basis of the German policy. She will try to exploit, organize, and weld the Russian State, no matter what government the latter may have, and she will have a faithful and helpful ally on the other side of Russia, namely, Japan.

The second group of German authors who have written on the Kaiser's correspondence with Nicholas goes much deeper into the matter, and tries to show and prove how evil and dangerous the former autocratic system was for Germany or for any country—really, how much depended on the whim of an unbalanced and mediocre monarch! Time and again the German policy was changed or shaped according to the fleeting mood, the idiosyncrasies or sympathies of an utterly irresponsible individual, who could bring upon his people incredible suffering.

These writings have their own great meaning and importance, owing to the fact that the monarchical parties in many countries are still very strong and by no means diminishing in influence. Germany's example ought to be studied in this respect; and the intimate letters of Wilhelm can be the best possible illustration of what rôle autocracy can play in the welfare of a people.

For the Russian historian Levine's volume has quite an exceptional interest. We can see, for example, how the Kaiser was hypocritically urging the Czar to withstand the Japanese demands, how he was pressing the necessity of a struggle with Japan, and how he was falsely lamenting the failure of the Russian armies. We know at present from other sources that Germany was at that moment counting on the weakening of Russia, and that Wilhelm was quite pleased that the Japanese had destroyed the Russian armed forces for a long period of years to come. The more diabolical and shamelessly false, therefore, do the utterances of the Kaiser appear. I think this example is the limit of hypocrisy. Russia's weakness was necessary for Germany, in order to frustrate any too-close alliance between St. Petersburg and Paris. As long as Russia was so helpless, France was weak, too!

During the later period of social trouble in Russia, Wilhelm developed a feverish activity and bombarded the Czar with all sorts of advice and information, counseling him to grant some reforms, but certainly to maintain at the same time the sacred institutions of autocracy. He repeatedly warned Nicholas to "rule in person," and not to let the ministers get the better of him. It is in these letters of 1905-1906 that we find most of his attacks against the parliamentary system of government and his shortsighted outbursts against England in particular and democracy in general. There no longer can be any doubt but that the foolish policy of Nicholas of those years, which strengthened the forces of Russian reaction, was inspired, if not created, by the whisperings from Berlin. William thus upheld his dear principle of autocracy on the one hand and further weakened Russia on the other.

In conclusion, we must mention the very deficient spelling of the French words all through the text of the

book. It is possible, but not at all probable, that the Kaiser wrote so badly in French. If, on the contrary, these mistakes were made during the copying of Wilhelm's letters, which is much more likely, this fact cannot help detracting from the authenticity and historical value of the text. This would be especially the case concerning the text of the treaties proposed by the Kaiser (#XL, for example). Historical writers must be very careful, in consequence, in handling these texts.

WAR, TAXATION, AND THE HUMANITIES

By E. B. ROSA, of the Bureau of Standards, Washington

The full text of this admirable address on "The Economic Importance of the Scientific Work of the Government" may be found in the *Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences*, June, 1920. We have made quotations from it, with the author's permission.—EDITORS.

OR MANY YEARS the revenues of the Federal Government were ample and easily obtained. Taxation was indirect and not felt and many of the developmental functions of the government were exercised with little question or objection. The World War involved enormous expenditures and increased the fixed charges due to the public debt and other war obligations to several times the former budget. The result is that expenditures for education, scientific research, and development work are severely scrutinized, and the question is raised as to whether we can afford to carry on such work on a generous scale. It is, of course, proper that every item in the national budget be closely scrutinized, and that nothing be passed which cannot justify itself. It is desirable, therefore, to inquire whether scientific research as carried on by the Federal Government is a luxury or a necessity; whether it is something to be enjoyed when taxes are light and curtailed when taxes are heavy; or whether it is creative and wealth-producing, and therefore to be increased and developed when expenses are abnormally large and a heavy debt must be liquidated. The question is, in short, whether scientific and industrial research and education are like good seed and fertilizer to a farmer, which are essential to the best success; or whether they are as luxuries to the rich, which consume but do not produce, and which should be curtailed when necessary expenses increase.

The National Budget

In order to discuss the question concretely and with reference to actual conditions, let us examine the national budget as it stands for the current fiscal year, with appropriations amounting to a total of \$5,686,005,706, as given in the regular supply bills and three deficiency bills prior to May 1, 1920. For convenience, we may divide it into six parts, as follows:

Group I. Obligations arising from recent and previous wars, including interest on the public debt, pensions, war-risk insurance, rehabilitation and care of soldiers, deficit in the operation of railways, expenditures of the Shipping Board, European food relief, and the bonus to govern-

	ment employees to partially cover the increased cost of living due to the war, a total of..	\$3,855,482,586
Group II.	War and Navy Departments, expenses somewhat above a permanent peace-time basis.....	1,424,138,677
Group III.	Primary governmental functions, including Congress, President and White House staff, courts and penal establishments, Departments of Justice, State, Treasury, Interior, Commerce, Labor, Interstate Commerce and other commissions, one-half the District of Columbia, including all the necessary functions of government other than defense, except the commercial activities of Group V and the research, education, and developmental work of Group VI.....	181,087,225
Group IV.	Public works, including rivers and harbors, public buildings, reclamation service, post-roads, national parks, and railway in Alaska	168,203,557
Group V.	Commercial or self-supporting activities, including the Post-Office, Patent Office, Land Office, Panama Canal, and Housing Corporation, which, taken together, earn their expenses.	
Group VI.	Research, educational, and developmental, including the wide range of work of the Agricultural Department, Geological Survey, Bureau of Mines, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Bureau of Standards, Bureau of Fisheries, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Women's and Children's Bureaus, Vocational Education, College for Agriculture and Mechanic Arts, Library of Congress, Smithsonian Institution, and the Public Health Service.....	57,093,661
Total.....		\$5,686,005,706

The first two groups together amount to 92.8 per cent of the total; public works amount to 3 per cent, primary governmental functions 3.2 per cent, and research, education, and developmental work 1 per cent. The population of the country being about 110,000,000, the total budget is about \$50 per year per capita, of which 50 cents per year per capita is expended for the wide range of research, education, and development.

Scientific Research and War

The war called for scientific research in connection with the standardization and making of munitions, finding and using substitute materials, locating enemy guns by sound and flash ranging, locating submarines, building and equipping ships and submarines, building and equipping airplanes, dirigibles, and balloons, and many other major subjects as well as countless minor ones. This called for well-equipped scientific laboratories and the trained personnel of research workers and assistants. The government laboratories were utilized to the limit of their capacity, and all kinds of makeshift facilities